

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

OFFICE OF MARINE SAFETY

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Major Marine Accident      :
Interviews of Investigation: :
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JAPANESE FISHERIES TRAINING VESSEL, :
    EHIME MARU              :   DCA 01 MM 022
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    and                     :
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U.S. NAVY NUCLEAR ATTACK SUBMARINE, :
    USS GREENEVILLE        :
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Monday, February 19, 2001

INTERVIEW OF LT PRITCHETT

INTERVIEWING PANEL:

National Transportation Safety Board

TOM ROTH-ROFFY, Investigator
BILL WOODY

United States Navy

CDR JOHN CACCIVIO, SUBPAC
LT DOUG HEDRICK, SUBPAC
LCDR RICH SANTOMAURO

United States Coast Guard

LTJG KEN KUSANO
LT CHARLIE JOHNSON

[TRANSCRIPT PREPARED FROM A TAPE RECORDING.]

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: We are here to interview
Lieutenant Pritchett.

LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Good morning, sir. My name
is Tom Roth-Roffy. I am an investigator with the
National Transportation Safety Board. I and several
other investigators are here to investigate the
accident that occurred between the USS Greeneville and
a fishing vessel, Ehime Maru, that occurred on February
9, 2001.

For your information, the National
Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal
government agency responsible for investigating marine
accidents that occur on United States waterways. The
purpose of the Safety Board's investigation is to
determine the cause of the accident and to make
recommendations aimed at preventing a future
reoccurrence of similar accidents.

In our investigation we make no effort to
assign blame to any person involved in the accident,
nor do we have any legal authority to penalize any
persons. Our investigation is strictly a safety
investigation, and not a legal investigation.

1 If you desire, you may have somebody with you
2 to assist you with the interview. Is that your desire?

3 Or, do you think you can make through the interview on
4 your own?

5 LT PRITCHETT: I don't need anyone to assist
6 me.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Very good.

8 Also joining me in this interview will be
9 representatives of the United States Navy and the
10 United States Coast Guard, and I would like to ask them
11 to introduce themselves at this time.

12 MR. WOODY: Bill Woody, NTSB.

13 LTJG KUSANO: Lieutenant Ken Kusano, United
14 States Coast Guard.

15 LT JOHNSON: Also joining would be Lieutenant
16 Charlie Johnson from the United States Coast Guard.

17 LCDR SANTOMAURO: Lieutenant Commander Rich
18 Santomauro, United States Navy.

19 LT HEDRICK: Lieutenant Doug Hedrick, United
20 States Navy.

21 CDR CACCIVIO: Commander Caccivio, United
22 States Navy.

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: With that, we would like to
24 begin the questioning, or interviewing. Sir, could you

1 please describe your activities during the underway
2 period onboard the Greeneville.

3 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir. I was assigned
4 contact coordinator for the -- watch leaving Pearl
5 Harbor. I was also scheduled to stand on watch upon
6 return to the port. Between those two times, my
7 primary job was to assist the engineer in escorting the
8 groups of civilians around, give them the tour, explain
9 any questions they had, showing them what the sub can
10 do. That was my primary responsibility.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: During the various angles
12 and dangles, and going to periscope depth, et cetera,
13 where were you located around that time?

14 LT PRITCHETT: I was located -- during that
15 time, coming to periscope depth, I was located between
16 Cruise Mess and Control the entire time. I remember
17 being in periscope depth for the initial low-power
18 searches by the OOD. That is the first time I remember
19 being in Control for that evolution.

20 I was in Control earlier that day, maybe for
21 some of the angles, but most of the angles, I was in
22 middle level. But for the set to periscope depth, like
23 I said, I was in Control at the time he was doing the
24 low-power searches.

1 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: If you would, sir, please
2 describe to the best of your recollection what you
3 remember from that, during that time you were in
4 Control, what you saw, what you heard, what people
5 might have told you or you might have told somebody
6 else. As much detail as you can, please.

7 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir. I remember getting
8 to Control and looking -- I was in the aft port corner
9 of Control by the Fathometer because that is where the
10 guests -- because there were sort of groups in the port
11 side of Control. I remember watching Lieutenant Coen
12 doing the normal safety sweeps. They seemed about the
13 right time, which is about eight seconds is when we do
14 low-power. I could tell it was low-power. I am
15 assuming it was. Then I heard a call, "We have close
16 contacts."

17 About then, he seemed like he was about to
18 start his airborne searches, and the Captain took the
19 scope from him and searched with the periscope for, I
20 would say, another 60 seconds or so before calling
21 emergency deep, and then he lowered the scope, and we
22 executed emergency deep procedure.

23 At some point before we reached our final
24 depth, I went down to cruise mess again to get another

1 glass of water for someone.

2 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And then, what did you do
3 after that?

4 LT PRITCHETT: After that, I returned to
5 Control, and I was in Control for the start of the
6 emergency blow-out. Through that time, up until the
7 collision, until about 30 seconds to a minute after
8 when I went down to go to check for flooding in the
9 Torpedo Room and the Machinery Room.

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: What is your assigned billet
11 on the submarine?

12 LT PRITCHETT: I am the chemistry and the
13 radiological controls assistant, as well as the ship's
14 diving officer.

15 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sir, please describe what
16 you felt when the collision occurred.

17 LT PRITCHETT: Well, when it occurred, I felt
18 kind of -- it seemed like a bang from right above my
19 head. I was standing, like I said, right by the
20 Fathometer at this time again. I had a little shudder,
21 not much. I mean, I wasn't thrown onto the ground. I
22 was still able to stand up. It lasted about, maybe,
23 one or two seconds. That's about it.

24 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I would like to pass the

1 interviewing to Mr. Bill Woody.

2 MR. WOODY: Mr. Pritchett, would you describe
3 what the diving officer position encompasses.

4 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir. It is basically
5 responsible for ensuring that the ship's ballast
6 condition at all times is proper. One of the most
7 important jobs is making sure that before our initial
8 dive at sea, the ship is rigged for dive.

9 We have -- it is part of the SSM procedure,
10 Ship's Systems Manual, on multiple items, to make sure,
11 basically, that you can conduct a safe dive, that
12 systems, in the event of a flooding or other emergency,
13 are available, such as an emergency blow, that the
14 escape trunks are -- the valves and them are lined up
15 properly, as well as, in port, I am responsible for the
16 list and trimming the ship, making sure that when we
17 bring on water or pump water off, that we are safe, the
18 hatches are maintained above the water line.

19 I think that is the primary functions.

20 Also, I am one of the routes that the
21 helmsman, planesman, chief of the watches, and diving
22 officer of the watches, come through in their
23 qualification process. I am not final qualification
24 officer on any of them. The helmsman and planesman go

1 through me, and then the navigator, to be qualified.
2 The chief of the watches go through me, and then the
3 executive officer, and then qualify. The diving
4 officer of the watches through me, the executive
5 officer and the commanding officer to qualify.

6 MR. WOODY: What is your position at battle
7 stations or general quarters?

8 LT PRITCHETT: At battle stations for this
9 watch, my position is plot coordinator, which is
10 supervising the geo-plot, the time-frequency plot at a
11 station. That is primarily --

12 MR. WOODY: Were any of those plots
13 functioning on the day that the ship was operating with
14 the visitors onboard?

15 LT PRITCHETT: I'm sorry?

16 MR. WOODY: Were any of those plots being
17 kept that day?

18 LT PRITCHETT: Those plots were not being
19 kept. They are normally not kept, except during a
20 section -- party or battle stations.

21 MR. WOODY: You say you were in the Control
22 Room at the time the ship came to periscope depth. Do
23 you recall what the depths were that ship came to?

24 LT PRITCHETT: I am not sure the initial

1 depth that the officer of that came to. I did hear the
2 Captain order a depth change to, I am fairly certain,
3 five-eight feet.

4 MR. WOODY: Five-eight.

5 LT PRITCHETT: Before he -- he started
6 searching for, maybe, five seconds, and then the depth
7 changed to five feet. So I am assuming -- this is an
8 assumption that the diving officer came to six-zero
9 feet, which is an appropriate depth to come to,
10 initially.

11 MR. WOODY: Did you hear any comments about
12 waves coming over the periscope?

13 LT PRITCHETT: I don't recall any. I don't
14 recall any specific comments, no.

15 MR. WOODY: Were there any admonitions to the
16 diving officer to "get me up" or anything like that?

17 LT PRITCHETT: I don't recall any.

18 MR. WOODY: Nothing like that? Was there
19 anything to indicate that there was any depth control
20 problems at that periscope depth?

21 LT PRITCHETT: Not that I can remember, sir.

22 MR. WOODY: Everything seemed to be normal?

23 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir, it did.

24 MR. WOODY: When the executive officer went

1 into sonar, were you there at the time he went into
2 sonar?

3 LT PRITCHETT: I did not observe the
4 executive officer at any time during this. I was --
5 there were like, maybe, 12 civilians in control, and
6 like I said, I was in the aft port corner. I couldn't
7 even see the entrance to sonar controls.

8 MR. WOODY: I see. What were you doing
9 there? What was your function being in the location by
10 the sonar -- by the Fathometer?

11 LT PRITCHETT: Oh, I was just -- I was with
12 the guests and I was answering questions, bringing them
13 -- I brought two cups of water and a cup of coffee,
14 that I know of during the time -- around the time
15 between the periscope and the emergency blow.

16 MR. WOODY: Could you describe to us in
17 general terms what it takes to become a qualified
18 officer of the deck. Are you qualified?

19 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir, I am. It takes --
20 simply, it takes completing the qual card, which the
21 last thing is interviewing with the commanding officer.
22 On that qual card, you go through several
23 qualifications before you are a qualified officer of
24 the deck.

1 On the officer of the deck qual card, the
2 first three lines say "completed qualification as," one
3 of the things is engineering officer of the watch,
4 which is the --

5 MR. WOODY: Engineering officer.

6 LT PRITCHETT: Engineering officer of the
7 watch, who is the officer in Maneuvering responsible
8 for the steam plan and action plan, as well as the
9 entire Engine Room.

10 Other watches that you have to qualify are
11 diving officer of the watch, contact coordinator,
12 surfaced officer of the deck, which is an earlier qual
13 than submerged officer of the deck. And I think that's
14 it.

15 MR. WOODY: So you are an officer of the
16 watch, diving officer, contact coordinator, and surface
17 OOD.

18 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

19 MR. WOODY: Which one is normally the first
20 one you do?

21 LT PRITCHETT: Normally, the first of all
22 those is contact coordinator.

23 MR. WOODY: Contact coordinator.

24 LT PRITCHETT: That probably takes an average

1 of one month maybe, one month.

2 MR. WOODY: Okay. What would be the next one
3 that you would --

4 LT PRITCHETT: Next is probably engineering
5 officer of the watch, which is maybe at the three- to
6 six-month point.

7 MR. WOODY: All right, and the next one?

8 LT PRITCHETT: Diving officer would be,
9 depending on when you qualify engineering officer of
10 the watch, maybe a month to two months after that.

11 MR. WOODY: You were saying the surface OOD?

12 LT PRITCHETT: The surface OOD, probably,
13 maybe to the eight-month point, or a month after the
14 diving officer of the watch.

15 MR. WOODY: I'm sorry, it would be eight
16 months after diving officer?

17 LT PRITCHETT: Eight months total, or about a
18 month after.

19 MR. WOODY: About a month after. I'm sorry.

20 LT PRITCHETT: A lot of it depends on when
21 you first qualify the early watches, because you are
22 concentrating on that until you can work on something
23 else. And officer of the deck, submerged, probably
24 nine months to a year.

1 MR. WOODY: Okay. Now, you mentioned that
2 you were in Control, standing in the same location
3 described, by the Fathometer, when the collision
4 occurred.

5 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

6 MR. WOODY: And you heard about what seemed
7 like -- what you described as being above your head.

8 LT PRITCHETT: It seemed like that, yes.

9 MR. WOODY: Was there ever any grating or
10 grinding noise, or vibration, or just -- think back and
11 try and tell us what you felt and heard.

12 LT PRITCHETT: It seemed like a shudder and a
13 little bit of shaking, not very metallic. I can't say
14 I heard any grinding noise. I really can't describe it
15 any better than that, just a loud kind of shudder.

16 MR. WOODY: Was it a matter of just a couple
17 of seconds that it happened? Or, one second?

18 LT PRITCHETT: It seemed like one to two
19 seconds.

20 MR. WOODY: One to two seconds. Had you
21 looked through the scope that day?

22 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

23 MR. WOODY: You had.

24 LT PRITCHETT: I was -- yes, I had.

1 MR. WOODY: That was on the way up --

2 LT PRITCHETT: Yes.

3 MR. WOODY: -- of course, when you were
4 contact coordinator.

5 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

6 MR. WOODY: And I know that only the Captain
7 looked at the scope at PD, periscope depth.

8 Do you have any recollection or knowledge of
9 how close you were to the position where the accident
10 happened when you looked through the scope?

11 LT PRITCHETT: See, sir, I was --

12 MR. WOODY: -- on the way up, or on the
13 surface.

14 LT PRITCHETT: By the time I left the scope,
15 we were at, probably, Buoys 1 and 2 on the Pearl Harbor
16 entrance. So distance-wise, I mean, you could probably
17 tell better than me using the chart, but it is maybe
18 eight or nine miles, I guess.

19 MR. WOODY: So you were you eight or nine
20 miles from where the accident happened when you last
21 used the scope.

22 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

23 MR. WOODY: What was the general visibility
24 in the area that you were at? Perhaps, if you looked

1 where the -- how did they look?

2 LT PRITCHETT: I'm sorry, could you say the
3 last part again?

4 MR. WOODY: Yes. Would you characterize the
5 visibility where you were?

6 LT PRITCHETT: It was right about -- the
7 visibility was not great. It wasn't like -- it wasn't
8 a reduced visibility scenario. The distance you could
9 see was farther than -- definitely farther than 4,000
10 yards, but it was -- I remember it being hazy enough,
11 and I did take the scope again, I would say, about 45
12 minutes after the collision. I relieved Lieutenant
13 Coen as contact coordinator.

14 I tell you then that it was bad enough that I
15 didn't want the paribus, which is the TV system, turned
16 on, because that uses a lot of light from the
17 periscope. I was primarily looking for personnel not
18 in a life raft at the time. We had No. 1 scope up by
19 then, too, and it was looking the same way. It has a
20 lot brighter look out of it. It doesn't rob as much
21 light.

22 But the visibility wasn't good. It wasn't
23 reduced visibility, but it wasn't great.

24 MR. WOODY: Was it overcast, or gray?

1 LT PRITCHETT: It was overcast and kind of
2 grayish. The skies were not blue very much. They
3 were --

4 MR. WOODY: Could you see the horizon,
5 though? Everything is sort of the horizon, but could
6 you see a clear and defined horizon?

7 LT PRITCHETT: I could not -- I am trying to
8 answer that question.

9 MR. WOODY: Just think back, yes.

10 LT PRITCHETT: It was -- from where I was, I
11 could not -- it was very hazy. Looking back towards
12 Pearl Harbor, it was hazy. I couldn't see distinct --
13 I mean, you could barely make out some buildings.
14 There was a haze there. It was hard to see.

15 MR. WOODY: Did you look above the haze to
16 see the buildings, or did you look below the haze?

17 LT PRITCHETT: Well, you are sort of looking
18 through it.

19 MR. WOODY: I see.

20 LT PRITCHETT: It wasn't like it was a level
21 that I could remember seeing above and below.

22 MR. WOODY: Do you recall where the wind was?

23 LT PRITCHETT: I do not recall that, sir.

24 MR. WOODY: How would you describe the seas,

1 let say, after the collision?

2 LT PRITCHETT: The seas, maybe three feet.

3 MR. WOODY: Three feet?

4 LT PRITCHETT: And I am not nearly the best
5 judge of that.

6 MR. WOODY: Had you come to periscope and
7 made a sweep around and checked for close contacts?

8 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

9 MR. WOODY: You have. How long does that
10 take you? You all vary, but for yourself.

11 LT PRITCHETT: I would say it takes -- my
12 periscope depth is when the scope breaks the wire, you
13 start your three low-power sweeps, about eight seconds
14 each. So it is 24 seconds in there. Then it is where
15 it is completely quiet and you don't make any other
16 reports when you see a contact, except to say, no close
17 contacts or emergency deep, during that time.

18 After that, you make about one eight-second,
19 high-power sweep -- correction, low-power sweep at max
20 elevation, looking for airborne contacts, and the same
21 thing at about 45 degree elevation.

22 MR. WOODY: There is a third one that is 45
23 degrees, or the second one is?

24 LT PRITCHETT: Yes. One at max elevation,

1 and then one at 45 degrees or so.

2 MR. WOODY: Okay.

3 LT PRITCHETT: That probably takes another 20
4 seconds or less.

5 MR. WOODY: Twenty seconds a piece?

6 LT PRITCHETT: Twenty seconds total, about
7 eight seconds for each phase-through. And then, I
8 would call out, "No close airborne contacts," assuming
9 there were none. When I call out, "No close contacts,"
10 by then, the ESM operator will usually call out, "No
11 close ESM contacts, or, calling the ESM, "No close ESM
12 contacts."

13 MR. WOODY: Going to periscope depth, do you
14 ever recall, when you don't expect to get sonar, giving
15 a report?

16 LT PRITCHETT: Right after the "No close
17 contacts" report, I would say.

18 MR. WOODY: They would come in next, and then
19 it would be ESM?

20 LT PRITCHETT: One of those two would be.

21 MR. WOODY: One of the two would be.

22 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir. Then I would do a
23 -- we would normally do a 45-second, 360-degree low-
24 power search, and that is when I would -- after that, I

1 would give Fire Control the periscope, and then call
2 the Captain and tell him that we are at periscope depth
3 and we hold no visual contacts.

4 MR. WOODY: When you say give Fire Control
5 the periscope, what do you --

6 LT PRITCHETT: The Fire Control technician of
7 the watch, the FCOW.

8 MR. WOODY: He would come in and man the
9 scope?

10 LT PRITCHETT: Yes.

11 MR. WOODY: Okay. How would he sweep? Would
12 he continue at low power?

13 LT PRITCHETT: He would continue at the
14 normal -- he would do a low-power 360 degrees at about
15 45 seconds, and then a high-power 90 degrees at about
16 45 seconds, and then I would continue with the low-
17 power.

18 MR. WOODY: How long would he man the scope
19 before --

20 LT PRITCHETT: Oh, just the amount the time
21 it took to call the Captain, maybe 30 seconds.

22 MR. WOODY: I see.

23 LT PRITCHETT: If there is another officer on
24 watch in Control, like a junior officer of the deck,

1 then he would be the one taking the scope.

2 MR. WOODY: That is a good question. I was
3 going to ask the number of officers on watch.

4 LT PRITCHETT: At this time, there were two,
5 and there usually are only two. During operations like
6 [inaudible] exercises or operations against other
7 submarines, there are as many as three officers in
8 Control on watch.

9 MR. WOODY: Now, the day of the accident, the
10 day that you had the important visitors, how many OODs
11 were there? Was there a JOD?

12 LT PRITCHETT: There was not a JOD.

13 MR. WOODY: Not a JOD that day.

14 LT PRITCHETT: No, sir.

15 MR. WOODY: What was the reason for it? Was
16 there any particular reason for it? A few people or
17 crowded conditions?

18 LT PRITCHETT: No, just that there normally
19 isn't. It would require a reason to have one.

20 MR. WOODY: Oh, I see.

21 LT PRITCHETT: Even like on our trip back
22 from San Francisco, which is the most recent underway
23 before that one, we never had a JOD.

24 MR. WOODY: Thank you very much.

1 LTJG KUSANO: This is Lieutenant Kusano. A
2 couple questions about the Ward Room, just a few. How
3 many officers in a Ward Room?

4 LT PRITCHETT: I would say about 16. I could
5 go through and think about it for a second.

6 LTJG KUSANO: Well, I mean, how many the
7 Department has.

8 LT PRITCHETT: Okay, there is a captain and
9 an executive officer, and there are four department
10 heads, an engineer, a navigator, a weapons officer and
11 a supply officer. Also, our perspective engineer is
12 part of the Ward Room right now.

13 Our division officers, there is a sonar
14 officer, the main propulsion assistant, [inaudible]
15 assistant, electrical officer, reactive controls
16 assistant, Auxiliary Division officer, and then we have
17 Lieutenant Phillips, who doesn't have ability yet,
18 Ensign Black. I think that is all there were at that
19 time. Lieutenant McClenethan [ph] was part of the crew
20 at that time as well.

21 LTJG KUSANO: On subs, when you get onboard,
22 you are automatically assigned a particular --

23 LT PRITCHETT: You are not automatically.
24 That is why we have two guys who have been here, maybe

1 -- almost six months, probably, and don't have one. It
2 varies.

3 LTJG KUSANO: So they make you get qualified
4 first, and then -- I guess they concentrate on getting
5 qualified.

6 LT PRITCHETT: They try to do that as much as
7 they can, and then --

8 LTJG KUSANO: Then when you are on the
9 road --

10 LT PRITCHETT: Right. Then they give you a
11 division, so you can not have to worry about the
12 administrative or other functions of a division officer
13 while you are trying to get qualified.

14 LTJG KUSANO: What is the typical watch --
15 what is the watch rotation once you are underway?

16 LT PRITCHETT: For a long underway where we
17 don't have a JOD or a JOW, it is probably a four-
18 section, which is -- usually, it seems like four. For
19 the officer of the deck, you stand six hours, the same
20 six hours every day.

21 Whereas, engineering officer of the watch --
22 because they normally want you back there, rotating
23 with your section. Most of the guys are mostly three-
24 section. So it seems like you stand a three-section

1 watch with one guy who stands the midnight watch every
2 time.

3 LTJG KUSANO: Is this your first sub?

4 LT PRITCHETT: This is my first sub.

5 LTJG KUSANO: This is your first sub. So,
6 how long have you been here?

7 LT PRITCHETT: I have been here since October
8 '99, so about a year and three months.

9 LTJG KUSANO: So you had a couple officers
10 come in --

11 LT PRITCHETT: Right. I have had a -- I got
12 here the week the last executive officer was leaving,
13 and since then, maybe three other -- three or four
14 other division officers have left, no department heads
15 or above.

16 LTJG KUSANO: Have you been on any other
17 vessels, in their Ward Rooms, when you were a cadet or
18 midshipman?

19 LT PRITCHETT: I was a midshipman on the USS
20 Ohio, and that is the only other sub.

21 LTJG KUSANO: On any other vessels?

22 LT PRITCHETT: As far as underway on?

23 LTJG KUSANO: Just in the Ward Room.

24 LT PRITCHETT: That is pretty much it.

1 LTJG KUSANO: So I guess, from what you have
2 seen in the past with other Ward Rooms, what would you
3 say your Ward Room was, close?

4 LT PRITCHETT: I would say they were close.
5 I mean, I have met people -- my roommate was on the
6 Chicago. So I have met -- I have never been on their
7 boat, but I have met a lot of people from his Ward
8 Room, and I think we are close. I would describe it as
9 that.

10 There is not a lot of -- when I first got
11 here, maybe the older ones, there were some cliques,
12 but now I think we all get along really well.

13 LTJG KUSANO: So you would say cliques?

14 LT PRITCHETT: Just a little. There was a
15 married guy who left because he didn't like the --
16 which is understandable. He had a little girl. He
17 didn't spend as much time with the Ward Room, but now
18 we are all pretty close.

19 LTJG KUSANO: When you say there were
20 cliques, these are Naval Academy guys, or RADSEA [ph],
21 or guys who stay in, or guys who stay out?

22 LT PRITCHETT: Not really, just, I would say,
23 guys in the same situation, like maybe the married
24 guys. In fact, when I got here, the Captain and I were

1 the only Academy guys here. Since then, we have three
2 more, the EXO, the new EXO, two other JOs, but there is
3 no split. It wasn't anything harsh. It wasn't.

4 LTJG KUSANO: When you say close, what is it,
5 you guys hung out together?

6 LT PRITCHETT: Yes. We played golf together,
7 even the department heads. It is a very close Ward
8 Room.

9 LTJG KUSANO: So then, going back to, kind
10 of, retention, what are most of the JOs doing? Do they
11 plan on staying in?

12 LT PRITCHETT: Of the ones that have left --
13 you mean the ones that have left since I got here?

14 LTJG KUSANO: Yes.

15 LT PRITCHETT: One of them is in Italy. He
16 plans to stay in. Another went to D.C., who is getting
17 out. I think he may have already submitted his
18 retirement paperwork -- or, his resignation paperwork.

19 Another went to D.C. as well, and he plans to stay in.

20 The last one went to San Diego, and I think he might
21 still be undecided.

22 LTJG KUSANO: What was the reason he put in
23 the letter of resignation?

24 LT PRITCHETT: The one guy?

1 LTJG KUSANO: Yes.

2 LT PRITCHETT: He wanted to do something
3 else. He wasn't unhappy. He was a good officer, he
4 just -- you know, he wanted to do something in the
5 civilian world.

6 LTJG KUSANO: So, what about, like, the CO? I
7 mean, was he -- what would you classify him as, a
8 screamer?

9 LT PRITCHETT: No, he was definitely not a
10 screamer. He was a -- you know, when you go to a sub
11 the first time, you hear all these stories, like you
12 expect everyone to be -- a lot of screamers, and watch
13 out, or don't screw up, but he wasn't like that. He
14 was a mentoring -- he would help you out if you had
15 problems. He could mad at times, but I wouldn't call
16 him a screamer at all.

17 LTJG KUSANO: What kind of things would he
18 get mad at?

19 LT PRITCHETT: Oh, just doing something
20 really stupid.

21 LTJG KUSANO: What would be something stupid?

22 LT PRITCHETT: One time I -- let me try and
23 think. I don't know, not following a procedure. Like,
24 we were doing a maintenance item once. I was the watch

1 and he was monitoring it, and we didn't -- we were
2 following -- I mean, he was not in a great mood that
3 day, but he was just, you know, not reporting an alarm
4 that came in, even though it is expected.

5 Other things, maybe, you know, surfacing the
6 ship without his permission, if you ever did that, but
7 no one would do that. You would expect him to get mad
8 for that. What I mean by that is, like, prepare to
9 surface and you get permission, and then you have to
10 get permission again when you actually surface,
11 something like that.

12 My first day as an , I almost did that. That
13 is why I remember that.

14 LTJG KUSANO: So, you mentioned procedures, I
15 mean, how could he get mad at you if you didn't follow
16 procedures?

17 LT PRITCHETT: He wouldn't scream. No, he
18 was your basic kind of guy.

19 LTJG KUSANO: He might not scream, but he was
20 more like, "Let's go to my stateroom" in front of
21 everybody.

22 LT PRITCHETT: No. He would rarely ever call
23 you to his stateroom. He would get mad at you in front
24 of everyone, but it is not like he screamed at you like

1 you were an idiot, you know.

2 LTJG KUSANO: But everyone in the Control
3 Room wouldn't be --

4 LT PRITCHETT: Well, this time it was in
5 Maneuvering, and everyone there would have known it.
6 There was about four watch centers in there. But he
7 wasn't a screamer.

8 LTJG KUSANO: So if someone did yell, did
9 make a mistake, what was it like in the Ward Room? Was
10 it like you talked, "The [inaudible] officer did this"?

11 LT PRITCHETT: No. It wasn't a -- I mean,
12 sometimes, we would make fun of some guy. It would be
13 like, "Hey, this guy did this again," or something, but
14 it wasn't like, you know, we talked about it like, "Oh,
15 no. He did this." Then the Captain, later on, he
16 would joke about it, "Yes, look what a dumb ass," as a
17 joke. It was a good Ward Room. You weren't afraid to
18 be on watch because you might make a mistake, is the
19 best way to say it.

20 LTJG KUSANO: I guess, in classifying
21 mistakes, I mean, what would be considered a major
22 mistake, and what would be considered minor?

23 LT PRITCHETT: Well, a major mistake, say, is
24 -- in the engineering officer of the watch, a major

1 mistake would be something that violated the reactor
2 safety, which, I mean, would be like -- I don't want to
3 classify this, but anything that would affect
4 [inaudible] strict procedures.

5 A lot of these procedures are written so that
6 if you follow them, you are going to be safe, and it
7 tells you sometimes not to do something. Sometimes, if
8 you don't do it, you know, it may not cause a problem,
9 but other times -- and there usually is, like, a
10 warning -- it is more of a problem. It could cause a
11 problem.

12 LTJG KUSANO: What about not following a
13 standing order?

14 LT PRITCHETT: Not following a standing
15 order, whether I call it a major or minor? Is that
16 your question?

17 LTJG KUSANO: Yes. Would that be --

18 LT PRITCHETT: It would be less of a major
19 than that one. It would be -- depending on, you know,
20 what it is. I don't say we follow them when we want
21 to, because it is not true, but there are a lot of
22 things in there.

23 Like going to periscope depth, one of the
24 parts of the CO standing order says "Inform

1 Maneuvering," and I don't think that always gets done,
2 and he would yell at you for not doing it, but it is to
3 let them back there know that maybe the throttlemans,
4 who is the guy who opens the valve to let steam to the
5 engines, be more alert that we are going to periscope
6 depth, so if we lose depth control, and we are, say,
7 snorkeling or ventilating, that, you know, he might be
8 ready to answer a faster bell. But I don't think it
9 always happens.

10 There is a digital depth gauge back in
11 Maneuvering, and you can feel the outbanging, so that
12 is not as important as some of the other standing
13 orders.

14 LTJG KUSANO: You as -- now, this is your
15 personal opinion now -- would you feel -- the Captain
16 is kind of taking charge of the situation. Let's say
17 it is a major evolution and you know something is not
18 right, how would you tell the Captain?

19 LT PRITCHETT: How would I --

20 LT PRITCHETT: How would you inform him --
21 would you, I mean -- it seems like he understands the
22 whole situation, but --

23 LT PRITCHETT: Right. I would say --

24 LTJG KUSANO: But something he may have

1 overlooked.

2 LT PRITCHETT: Right. I would say, "Sir, we
3 are doing this; recommend not doing that," or
4 something.

5 LT PRITCHETT: You would feel comfortable?

6 LT PRITCHETT: I would feel comfortable. You
7 know, I wouldn't feel like I was afraid to say that,
8 because he could always say, "I wouldn't do this,"
9 anyway, or he could say, "Well, here is what you have
10 wrong about the situation."

11 And so, I wouldn't feel afraid to not, you
12 know, question -- if it was something clearly wrong.
13 If it was something that was a judgement call, maybe,
14 you know, I would have a little harder time saying
15 something, but I wouldn't feel afraid to.

16 LTJG KUSANO: That is all I have. Thanks.

17 LT JOHNSON: Lieutenant Johnson, U.S. Coast
18 Guard.

19 I'm sorry, I didn't hear you start this,
20 except for the drydock. If you have already been asked
21 this, please tell me.

22 What is your job on the ship? What do you
23 do?

24 LT PRITCHETT: I have been asked this, but I

1 can tell you again. It is the chem rad con assistant.

2 LT JOHNSON: Okay, great. Were you in the
3 Control Room during any of the evolution?

4 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, I was.

5 LT JOHNSON: You were. So you were observing
6 things?

7 LT PRITCHETT: Yes.

8 LT JOHNSON: You were off OOD?

9 LT PRITCHETT: Yes.

10 LT JOHNSON: If you felt that you were in an
11 unsafe situation, would you ask the Captain to relieve
12 you as qualified officer of the deck?

13 LT PRITCHETT: If I -- can you clarify that a
14 little bit?

15 LT JOHNSON: Yes. If you felt like the
16 situation -- you were being overwhelmed by the
17 situation, and that you were getting into an area that
18 you were not comfortable with, would you asked to be
19 relieved as the officer of the deck?

20 LT PRITCHETT: I think I would. I don't know
21 if I would ask to be relieved or I would say, "Captain"
22 -- I would explain that, "I am having trouble here,
23 could he either help me or get a more senior guy up
24 here."

1 LT JOHNSON: Was the Control Room very
2 crowded that day?

3 LT PRITCHETT: It was fairly crowded, yes.
4 It was --

5 LT JOHNSON: Was it confusing?

6 LT PRITCHETT: It is hard for me to say
7 because I wasn't really trying to communicate with the
8 watch standers. I remember for the periscope -- for
9 the low-power searches when we first came to periscope
10 depth T, it wasn't noisy at all, and sometimes it even
11 gets noisy with just the watch standers up there. So
12 he may have had to tell them to be quiet while he was
13 coming up, but when he said "No close contact," it was
14 clear.

15 LT JOHNSON: Did you ever hear the officer of
16 the deck tell the Captain that he had not completed his
17 low-power search with the periscope?

18 LT PRITCHETT: I did not hear him tell him
19 that.

20 LT JOHNSON: Did you ever hear the officer of
21 the deck comment on the periscope going underwater or
22 receiving wave slap?

23 LT PRITCHETT: I can't remember hearing that.

24 LT JOHNSON: That's all I have.

1 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, I have got a couple of
2 more questions.

3 LT HEDRICK: Do we have time to --

4 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I'm sorry, Lieutenant. I
5 was going right past Lieutenant Hedrick.

6 LT HEDRICK: Lieutenant Doug Hedrick.

7 Do you need to take a break, Lieutenant
8 Pritchett?

9 LT PRITCHETT: No, I am fine.

10 LT HEDRICK: You said the CO searched for
11 about five seconds and ordered up five-eight feet. You
12 remembered that. You said you didn't remember any
13 reports of wave slap or anything like that.

14 As the qualified officer of the deck, would
15 it be reasonable to assume that if you were in Control
16 during this time, and there was a significant depth
17 control issue, that you probably would have been aware
18 of it?

19 LT PRITCHETT: I would have been aware
20 because I had been on watch for a significant -- you
21 know, it is like -- significant, you mean come to 70
22 feet or whatever? I am just having, really, trouble --
23 I think I would have remembered if there was a
24 significant depth control -- now, there are times when

1 you lose a few feet and the scope goes under, and they
2 just come back up.

3 LT HEDRICK: So you probably wouldn't be able
4 to specifically be able to recall, necessarily, a depth
5 change of a couple feet, or maybe one or two small
6 comments about wave slap or whatever, but if there was
7 a significant issue about the scope being under a
8 predominant amount of time, you would expect some type
9 of dialogue and you probably would have remembered
10 that.

11 LT PRITCHETT: Yes.

12 LT HEDRICK: That is a lot of assumptions
13 because you were doing some other things. I am just
14 trying to get a reasonable idea.

15 You said you were in the aft port corner of
16 Control, and from there you could not see the door to
17 Sonar, something about a questionable Sonar. Normal
18 underway, watches manned, submerged, no VIPs, standing
19 where you were in the aft port corner of Control, would
20 you be able to see the door to Sonar?

21 LT PRITCHETT: I would be able to.

22 LT HEDRICK: You would be able to. Okay.
23 What about at battle stations? Assuming you are not at
24 your battle station as plot coordinator for somebody

1 else's, do you think you would be able to see the door
2 to Control from where you are?

3 LT PRITCHETT: It would be -- I think I would
4 because, just the concentration of people at battle
5 stations, it is in a little different area than the
6 visitors were. They were sort of in the port and
7 forward part of Control. At battle stations, it is
8 kind of the starboard at the fire control screens in
9 the aft where all the plotting -- and there are more
10 people in the Con. There is an officer of the deck, a
11 junior officer of the deck, and the Captain, which is
12 the operator. So maybe.

13 LT HEDRICK: Okay. Just a couple more
14 questions on the quals, just to make sure that the
15 records are straight, or, not straight, have a little
16 more detail.

17 Are you required to qualify basic officer?

18 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

19 LT HEDRICK: Is that an early qual?

20 LT PRITCHETT: That is a very early qual.

21 LT HEDRICK: What is a five-second synopsis
22 of what basic officer is?

23 LT PRITCHETT: Basic officer is learning some
24 knowledge about damage control and how to rig for dive,

1 which is as I described before.

2 LT HEDRICK: Are you required to qualify
3 battery-charging [inaudible]?

4 LT PRITCHETT: That, I am not sure if you are
5 for -- I would say probably yes, but it is another
6 early qual. It takes you maybe two to three weeks. I
7 am not sure. I think -- I really don't know. Maybe.

8 LT HEDRICK: Are you required to -- the
9 normal sequence that you gave to Mr. Woody, is that a
10 required sequence, or just the normal sequence?

11 LT PRITCHETT: It is the normal sequence.
12 There are some parts of it that are required, like you
13 have to qualify diving officer before you qualify
14 officer -- or, before you qualify surfaced officer of
15 the deck, but it is not -- you can do that at some
16 different order.

17 LT HEDRICK: The description, the general
18 sequence that you gave, what percentage of officers
19 would you say followed that, based on your experience?

20 LT PRITCHETT: The [inaudible] procedure?

21 LT HEDRICK: No, the sequence of
22 qualifications. Fifty percent, 90 percent?

23 LT PRITCHETT: I would say 90 percent, maybe
24 even higher.

1 LT HEDRICK: How long ago did you qualify
2 officer of the deck?

3 LT PRITCHETT: I qualified in August of 2000.

4 LT HEDRICK: August of 2000. How many -- was
5 the ship in an underway periods since then?

6 LT PRITCHETT: It has, but not many. I have
7 not stood that many watches since then.

8 LT HEDRICK: If you had to estimate, are we
9 talking single digits, tens, 50, 100?

10 LT PRITCHETT: Maybe single-digit OODs since
11 we were out on a -- we are working up for an ORS
12 inspection, and I am an ORS engineering officer of the
13 watch, so I have been standing most of the watch right
14 there.

15 LT HEDRICK: Are you familiar -- as qualified
16 officer of the deck, are you familiar with ESF?

17 LT PRITCHETT: Yes.

18 LT HEDRICK: Are you familiar with the Early
19 Warning Receiver?

20 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, I am.

21 LT HEDRICK: How would you characterize your
22 qualification process? Would you characterize it as
23 fairly representative of other officers, or would you
24 think that you got exceptionally more attention, or

1 less attention?

2 LT PRITCHETT: I think it was -- I think I
3 qualified a little faster than most officers. Not
4 because I got any more or less attention, no.

5 LT HEDRICK: Okay. Do you think you could
6 identify the difference between a signal strength 3, 4,
7 and 5 ESM contacts in the Early Warning Receiver?

8 LT PRITCHETT: No. You couldn't use the
9 Early Warning Receiver. That is just a false
10 repetition, so you couldn't identify a 3, 4, and 5, or
11 I couldn't.

12 LT HEDRICK: So you wouldn't be able to tell
13 the difference between signal strength 5 and signal
14 strength 3?

15 LT PRITCHETT: No, I wouldn't. I would go
16 with -- clearly based on what the ESM report, and for
17 him, it is judgement, too.

18 LT HEDRICK: Okay. You said that you took
19 the scope about 45 minutes after the collision?

20 LT PRITCHETT: Yes.

21 LT HEDRICK: Do you recall that you could see
22 any land masses? I know that is not what you were
23 looking for.

24 LT PRITCHETT: I couldn't -- yes. I was -- I

1 think maybe, very hazy, you could see, you know, the
2 buildings of Honolulu, but as far as, like, land
3 masses, no. No.

4 LT HEDRICK: So that, you said you think you
5 could make out some of the buildings of Honolulu but it
6 was hazy.

7 LT PRITCHETT: Right.

8 LT HEDRICK: That is all I have. Thank you
9 very much.

10 LT PRITCHETT: Could I add something really
11 fast?

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I have actually got a few
13 more questions, but go ahead and make your statement.

14 LT PRITCHETT: Well, he reminded me on this.

15 It was something that I observed on the first
16 periscope depth, that the ESM question reminded me of.

17 I remember seeing, after getting the PD, Lieutenant
18 Coen turn the volume down on the Early Warning Receiver
19 amplifier, which indicates to me that he had it on loud
20 enough to hear the static in there. And that is all I
21 remember.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, just to follow up on
23 ESM, what is the function of the Early Warning speaker
24 or amplifier that the OODs can hear when you go to PD?

1 LT PRITCHETT: For you to hear a pulse
2 repetition frequency to determine maybe how close a
3 contact is.

4 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So by the pulse repetition
5 frequency, you are able to determine how close the
6 contact is.

7 LT PRITCHETT: Well --

8 [Tape interruption.]

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay, we had a minor glitch
10 there. Some sensitive material might have been given,
11 disclosed. So we backed up the tape to the point where
12 we feel it is okay, and I am going to ask Lieutenant
13 Pritchett the question that was posed.

14 LT PRITCHETT: I think -- yes, you can
15 determine, and there is a thumb rule for it that I
16 don't recall right now to determine the range based on
17 false repetition frequency, which is how fast the radar
18 pulses are coming in.

19 Whereas, what I understand the signal
20 strength to be is just like an amplitude of the radar
21 signal.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I was out of the room
23 briefly, but did you talk about the value of the
24 various indicators that you had available to you as

1 officer of the deck in order to assess contact
2 solution? Was that covered at all?

3 You know, as officer of the deck, you have a
4 number of inputs available to you. Maybe you could
5 just talk a little bit about those, and I am referring
6 specifically to those you would use before you went to
7 periscope depth.

8 LT PRITCHETT: Before coming to periscope
9 depth, the two most important indicators are, and they
10 are sort of tied together, are the sonar, the passive
11 sonar system, and the fire control system, which gets
12 its data from the sonar system. Those are definitely
13 the two most important coming to periscope depth.

14 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: As officer of the deck, what
15 would you look at to utilize the information available?

16 LT PRITCHETT: I would look at the sonar
17 display that is in Control, as to -- which, you can see
18 the lines of bearing of any traces, of whether or not
19 they are ships or just marine life, or just, you know,
20 traces of the weather, as well as there are four fire
21 control screens that there are various modes on them.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: In general terms here.

23 LT PRITCHETT: In general terms, there is a
24 mode where they have these bearing dots that come in of

1 a contact's bearing, and they manipulate these encoders
2 and they try to give them a solution that matches with
3 the bearing dots. There is also another screen that it
4 shows sort of an OP summary. It shows like -- it is
5 like a plot, almost. You are here, and it shows all
6 these ships, based on the solution they have entered,
7 as well as one that shows just a bearing over time of
8 the bearings they get.

9 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Is there anything else that
10 you would normally look at to help you evaluate your
11 situation?

12 LT PRITCHETT: Those are the primary of the
13 things you -- I mean, you would obviously -- you would
14 know if the WLR-9 had any information that it was
15 giving you because it is pretty clear. That is one of
16 the things, you would make sure that the amplitude --
17 that the volume is turned up on that, because you need
18 to hear it, as well as the underwater speaker system.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: WLR-9 is what, again? I'm
20 sorry.

21 LT PRITCHETT: It is --

22 LT HEDRICK: Lieutenant Hedrick.

23 WLR-9 is a sonar intercept receiver that
24 would be able to detect Fathometers and fish finders.

1 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I understand.

2 We heard something about a CEP. Would you
3 look at that at any time?

4 LT PRITCHETT: I would also look at the CEP,
5 which is contact evaluation.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you subjectively
7 weight the value of each of these displays to helping
8 you assess your situation?

9 LT PRITCHETT: I could do that. I would say
10 the -- let me think about this for a second.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Sure. Take all the time you
12 need.

13 LT PRITCHETT: Probably the sonar display, I
14 would weigh, maybe, 50 or 60 percent; the fire control
15 screen maybe -- well, maybe 40 percent sonar; say 40
16 percent fire control; and I would say 20 percent CEP.

17 The reason I am not saying the others is
18 because they are either -- if you hear something on
19 them, you are going to check that out, definitely.
20 Otherwise, it is just making sure that the volume is
21 turned on and you don't hear anything.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So, roughly, you would give
23 equal weight to the ASADO [ph] and the sonar display --
24 I'm sorry, and the fire control display.

1 How easy is it to see the fire control
2 displays? Are they small screens? Do you have to
3 cycle through them? I don't really have a feel for
4 that.

5 LT PRITCHETT: There are about four 15-inch
6 monitor-type screens. They are like a monochrome with
7 green, like your old monochrome monitors, and there are
8 four of them, so they can all be set on different
9 modes. So you don't have to really cycle through them
10 to see what you need to see, usually.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And the fire controlman of
12 the watch, is he controlling what is selected as far as
13 what you see? Or, is there a separate unit that you,
14 as officer of the deck, are able to go to and
15 independently look at?

16 LT PRITCHETT: Right. Each of these four
17 units has keys where I, as off the deck, could go and
18 switch it to what I wanted to look at, and I do that
19 before, and other officer of the decks do that, too.

20 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: How does that compare with
21 what the fire control of the watch is doing? Does he
22 have his own console?

23 LT PRITCHETT: Normally, he uses maybe three
24 consoles, and one of them -- there are on the different

1 modes that I was talking about. He can look at those
2 while he is trying to -- one of them is the first mode
3 I talked about where these dots come on. He is trying
4 to get the solution for the contact. Another one has
5 the bearings dots of the contact as they come in.

6 So he can sort of get, what we call a bearing
7 rate, how much it is changing over time. The third one
8 that he would use would either be another one like the
9 first one, and that is probably what he would -- based
10 on how many -- that way, he wouldn't have to cycle
11 through different contacts.

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Okay. I'm sorry, I am
13 probably not asking the question right, but, would you
14 have to look over his shoulder at his display, or is
15 there a separate unit that you would look at and
16 manipulate?

17 LT PRITCHETT: I could do both. I would
18 normally look over his shoulder to see what he is
19 doing, because you wouldn't have to -- it is not hard
20 to look because you are elevated on the Con.

21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: But you would have to come
22 fairly close to the console to --

23 LT PRITCHETT: Right, you would, yes. Oh, I
24 see what you mean.

1 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: You couldn't see it from
2 across the room.

3 LT PRITCHETT: There is no remote repeater or
4 anything. You would have to come to the area that he
5 is at.

6 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Is it true that there is a
7 separate display for each contact, each Sierra number
8 being tracked? You would have to cycle through each
9 one to get an idea --

10 LT PRITCHETT: Now, there is a time-bearing
11 -- you will have all the contacts, as well as an OP
12 summary where you have the chart.

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So really, to get a complete
14 picture of your contact situation, you would have to
15 spend some time manipulating, stepping through various
16 screens.

17 LT PRITCHETT: If you had multiple contacts,
18 you would have to do that.

19 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Do you have something,
20 Lieutenant, that would clarify this at all? Because I
21 see your --

22 LT HEDRICK: This is Lieutenant Hedrick.

23 A lot of this has to do with this specific
24 training and experience, and what their Ward Room

1 trains on. There is going to be an entire range of
2 that, from maybe the weighting, he said, between fire
3 control and sonar data.

4 What wasn't asked that maybe you would like
5 to ask is, what weight is given to the interpretation
6 of that data by the watch standers at the watch
7 stations, the sonar and the fire control, and whether
8 or not that is taken into account.

9 If you are trying to draw generalizations
10 about the entire Navy and the Submarine Force from just
11 the crew of the Greeneville, that would be tough. I
12 know in my practical experience, the last two or three
13 ships I was on, the standard weighting is, if the
14 officer of the deck didn't say 80 or 90 percent sonar,
15 then he would have a discussion with the senior watch
16 officer or the captain or the EXO to make sure he
17 understood what is the safety of the ship.

18 The problem with the fire control system, or
19 anything else where you are manipulating data like
20 that, is, there is more than one possible thing that
21 might make the display look good. So sonar, a lot of
22 times, is given more weight by a lot of folks, not to
23 say that anything that Lieutenant Pritchett said is
24 specifically wrong or forbidden by procedure.

1 Although, to assess the quality of the
2 solution for each contact, you would need to cycle
3 through screens or have multiple screens up of the
4 three types of screens he described, the time-bearing
5 one, the OP sum, which gives you a plot of all the
6 contacts, and the one where you are actually
7 determining a solution.

8 Of those three, two of them show all the
9 contacts at the same time. I don't know if that aspect
10 of it was clear.

11 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Yes. It is kind of hard for
12 me to visualize exactly, without having seen the
13 equipment in operation.

14 LT HEDRICK: Two of the three, the time-
15 bearing one looks very much like a CDP. The only
16 difference is that on ships heading, depth, and speed,
17 and any other notes that the CDP plotter would make,
18 isn't on there, but it is all the contact's bearings
19 over time, which also gives you an indication of when
20 you held those contacts, and when you didn't hold the
21 contacts. If there are no dots for five minutes, then
22 that would be a five-minute period of time where you
23 held no contacts.

24 Then OP sum is like if you were looking down

1 on the ocean from up above, centered on the ship, it
2 shows you the position of all the contacts -- of
3 course, scales are variable -- and what direction they
4 are heading, and even a little bit of an indication to
5 give you how fast those contacts are heading, based on
6 the last system solution that was entered.

7 And just as a point of clarification, I think
8 there are some thumb rules associated with ESM, based
9 on the characteristics of an emitter, and those would
10 be things such as the maximum range our radar can
11 detect, and also the minimum resolution our radar can
12 detect.

13 Based on some of the physical parameters, you
14 can determine, well, if the radar is only -- the radar
15 is sweeping for three seconds, and if I am four seconds
16 of radar time away, he is not going to detect me
17 because he has done another sweep.

18 So you can determine a maximum range that
19 that radar is sensing. You could also determine a
20 minimum resolution such as, is this radar accurate
21 enough to detect, say, a periscope, or can it detect a
22 small skiff, or can it detect a large ocean ship.

23 Now you get into other factors of sea state
24 and all kinds of other things, but the thumb rules

1 involve resolution of a radar and maximum range, not
2 current range right now.

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: About the CEP, this manual
4 plot maintained by the fire controlman, you indicate a
5 lower weighting for that.

6 Could you describe why you did that?

7 LT PRITCHETT: A lower weighting only because
8 the time-bearing screen of the fire control system,
9 which is the one that I would place most weight in
10 because it is -- it basically serves the same thing as
11 a CEP. A CEP is just a graphic way to -- and some
12 officers actually use it more than others, but it is
13 just a graphic way to show the contacts held and their
14 bearings over time.

15 I just happen to like looking at the screen
16 better. This isn't screen that is adjustable based on
17 solution. This is the one where the bearings come in,
18 the exact bearing, the time that the sonar held the
19 contact. Still, it may not be true because the sonar
20 detractor, which is what sends the data from sonar to
21 fire control, might be off, not exactly on the contact.
22 But it is generally the same information.

23 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Could you see that CEP from
24 a greater distance than the displays at the fire

1 control console?

2 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, you could.

3 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: From the position -- as you
4 recall, the officer of the deck was standing his watch
5 prior to going to periscope depth, could he see the
6 CEP?

7 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, I think so. Like I said,
8 I could see the sonar, which is about where the CEP is.
9 I can't tell that, but -- actually, it is hard for me
10 to answer. I would say yes, but I don't know, because
11 I could see that from where I was.

12 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: To look at the fire control
13 consoles, you would have to make way over to that area.
14 Did you notice if there were people standing around
15 there, visitors, guests, that might have in some way
16 blocked his access to look at that console?

17 LT PRITCHETT: I didn't notice that,
18 specifically. There were, earlier in the day, guests
19 over there, so I am guessing they might be because it
20 to fit 12 guests in Control, it takes a lot of space.

21 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Lieutenant Hedrick.

22 LT HEDRICK: Lieutenant Hedrick.

23 Do you recall what time you got in to
24 Control? You said you were in Control during the

1 ascent to PD and some of the time at PD. Was the ship
2 oriented at an up angle coming up when you got in
3 there --

4 LT PRITCHETT: The first thing I --

5 LT HEDRICK: -- or were you in there a few
6 minutes prior to preparations, maybe?

7 LT PRITCHETT: I was not in there for
8 preparations. The first thing I remember, I remember
9 almost walking up that aft ladder by the [inaudible] to
10 Control, and then seeing the low-power sweep in
11 progress, or the visual. Then they started the low-
12 power sweep.

13 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: I believe you said that the
14 officer of the deck made a quick sweep, I think, 15
15 seconds is what you said.

16 LT PRITCHETT: He made three sweeps of about
17 eight seconds each.

18 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: And then the commanding
19 officer took the scope, and he made about one one-
20 minute sweep?

21 LT PRITCHETT: I would say about one minute.

22 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Was that adequate, do you
23 think, for what he was supposed to be doing, looking
24 around?

1 LT PRITCHETT: That is a hard question for me
2 to answer, just because I didn't see what he was
3 seeing. I didn't know whether he was looking -- I
4 wasn't really focused on what he was looking for. If
5 he was looking down a certain bearing, maybe it was
6 adequate. That is a hard question for me to answer.

7 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: Did you happen to notice
8 which bearing he was --

9 LT PRITCHETT: I did not.

10 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: -- paying particular
11 attention to?

12 LT PRITCHETT: No, I didn't.

13 MR. WOODY: Bill Woody.

14 The OOD went up to the scope to take a look
15 around. How long had he been looking around before he
16 turned the ESM volume down?

17 LT PRITCHETT: I think he turned it down
18 while the Captain had the scope.

19 MR. WOODY: While the Captain had the scope.

20 LT PRITCHETT: So at some point after he
21 turned over the scope to the Captain.

22 MR. WOODY: The last thing we usually do is
23 ask a few personal questions, about four or five of
24 them, like age, height, weight. One of them is a 72-

1 hour history we also ask.

2 Now, your executive officer has been given a
3 form like this. It has this part on the bottom. Since
4 you were not with us, you probably will not get one to
5 fill out.

6 LT PRITCHETT: No, sir.

7 MR. WOODY: If you could acquire one and fill
8 it out, and send it up to us, we would sure appreciate
9 it.

10 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

11 MR. WOODY: Okay? It saves some time. It
12 asks you what you were doing the last week or so.

13 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

14 MR. WOODY: We will start with your age.

15 LT PRITCHETT: I am 27.

16 MR. WOODY: And your height and weight?

17 LT PRITCHETT: I am 5'9", 166 pounds.

18 MR. WOODY: How is your current health?

19 LT PRITCHETT: Excellent health.

20 MR. WOODY: Are you taking any kind of
21 medication prescribed by a physician?

22 LT PRITCHETT: No, sir.

23 MR. WOODY: Do you wear glasses?

24 LT PRITCHETT: No, sir.

1 MR. WOODY: Is your vision near 20/20?

2 LT PRITCHETT: My vision in my left eye is
3 20/20, the right eye is 20/35.

4 MR. WOODY: This is before the accident.
5 During the last month, the last few weeks, have there
6 been any highs and lows in your life, like anything of
7 a depressing or saddening nature?

8 LT PRITCHETT: No, sir.

9 MR. WOODY: Anything of particularly good
10 news, particularly exhilarating, or anything like that
11 that has happened to you?

12 LT PRITCHETT: No, sir.

13 MR. WOODY: That is all we have, and if you
14 will remember to get this form, we would appreciate
15 that very much.

16 LT PRITCHETT: Yes, sir.

17 MR. ROTH-ROFFY: So the time being about
18 11:49, that concludes our interview of Lieutenant
19 Pritchett.

20 [End of interview.]

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